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THE COMMON LAW ENDURES IN THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
George C. Thomas III*
ABSTRACT
The text of the Fourth Amendment provides no guidance about what makes a
search unreasonable or when warrants are required to make a search reasonable. The
Supreme Court has had to craft a doctrine based on intuition, policy goals, and half-
hearted stabs at history. This Article argues that the Court’s Fourth Amendment doc-
trine is stable when it roughly tracks the eighteenth-century common law protection
of property, privacy, and liberty. When the Court has sought to provide more
protection than the common law provided, the result has been an erratic doctrine that
has gradually receded almost back to the common law contours. The most recent
move away from a robust Fourth Amendment has been to reduce the application of
the exclusionary rule. As there was no exclusionary rule at common law, and for
over a century after the Fourth Amendment was ratified, further reductions in the
rule’s application can be expected.
INTRODUCTION
To understand the Supreme Court’s current Fourth Amendment doctrine, it is
critical to understand the common law protection of privacy, property, and liberty
that existed in colonial America and in eighteenth-century England. The thesis of
this Article is that when the Court has expanded Fourth Amendment doctrine too far
from the common law, that innovation becomes unstable and is later overruled or
diminished. When the Court roughly follows the common law, however, the result-
ing doctrine in most cases is as strong today as it was when decided.
To be sure, as Donald Dripps points out, the common law was not static in 1791,
and we have no reason to believe that the Framers intended the Fourth Amendment
to protect the degree of privacy and liberty that the common law protected when the
Fourth Amendment was drafted or ratified.1 Moreover, the modern world, including
the modern world of policing, is very different from the Framers’ world.2 Thus, a
* Rutgers Board of Governors Professor of Law; Judge Alexander P. Waugh, Sr.
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1 Donald A. Dripps, Responding to the Challenges of Contextual Change and Legal
Dynamism in Interpreting the Fourth Amendment, 81 MISS. L.J. 1085, 1088 (2012).
2 Id. See generally George C. Thomas III, Time Travel, Hovercrafts, and the Framers:
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literal originalism would sometimes create unacceptable results. For one example,
a colonial officer who arrested the wrong person was strictly liable in trespass law
even if the officer had an arrest warrant and the arrestee told the officer, falsely, that
he was the person named in the warrant.3 This result is required, Bacon’s treatise
tells us, because “the Officer is at his Peril to take Care that he arrests the right Per-
son.”4 A clever person could thus create the basis for a tort suit against a completely
innocent officer.
While the common law arrest-at-peril rule might have made sense in a world of
small villages and farms, when the constable would know almost everyone, it makes
little sense in today’s world. If we transplanted that doctrine to today’s world with
exclusion of evidence as the principal remedy for Fourth Amendment violations, the
State would lose evidence seized after the arrest of the wrong person no matter how
reasonable was the officer’s mistake. This mindless elevation of liberty at all costs
simply does not fit our modern world.
Moreover, the common law transplanted literally to today would create a radically
incomplete Fourth Amendment. What would the common law of tort say, for ex-
ample, about attaching a GPS to a vehicle and monitoring that GPS? Justice Scalia’s
attempt to argue that this would have been a trespass at common law—a constable
could have hidden in a coach and thus monitored the movement of the coach5—
produced a funny riposte from Justice Alito: “this would have required either a
gigantic coach, a very tiny constable, or both—not to mention a constable with
incredible fortitude and patience.”6 Then there is electronic surveillance. Justice
Black made a literalist claim on this point in his dissent in Katz v. United States.7
Wiretapping is “nothing more than eavesdropping by telephone . . . an ancient
practice which at common law was condemned as a nuisance. . . . There can be no
doubt that the Framers were aware of this practice, and if they had desired to”
include it in the Fourth Amendment, “they would have used the appropriate lan-
guage to do so. . . .”8
The Katz majority ignored Black’s originalism argument, but it seems to me far
from clear that electronic listening is the same as listening under someone’s win-
dow. For one thing, the common law eavesdropper who wanted to overhear conver-
sations in a dwelling had to be a trespasser, at least on the curtilage if not inside the
James Madison Sees the Future and Rewrites the Fourth Amendment, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1451 (2005) [hereinafter Thomas, Time Travel] (describing various categories of searches
in the modern world that would have been unknown to the Framers and seeking to write a
“new” Fourth Amendment to deal with those searches).
3 5 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 163 (1766).
4 Id.
5 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 n.3 (2012).
6 Id. at 420 n.3 (Alito, J., concurring).
7 389 U.S. 347, 366 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
8 Id.
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dwelling; today, words inside a home can be overheard without coming close to the
home. And as Justice Douglas once remarked: “What the ancients knew as ‘eavesdrop-
ping,’ we now call ‘electronic surveillance’; but to equate the two is to treat man’s
first gunpowder on the same level as the nuclear bomb.”9 If Black’s eavesdropping
analogy is unpersuasive, then the common law tells us nothing about how the
electronic surveillance cases should be decided. Moreover, what would we make of
vehicle inspection stops, drawing of blood, fingerprinting, and DNA databases? A
Fourth Amendment world that looks only to originalism leaves much unclear, as
even Justice Scalia implicitly acknowledged.10
My goal in this Article is thus not to create a comprehensive account of the
Fourth Amendment that draws on some form of originalism. Rather, I wish to show
that there were fundamental values that supported the common law, generally
understood in the late eighteenth century. My basic theory is similar to one Dripps
developed, based in part on one I offered in 2005.11 Dripps argued that Fourth
Amendment issues should be decided by asking “whether a ruling for one side or the
other would move us closer to the privacy/security balance favored by the founders.
Second, we can look to the specific rules and practices of the founding era as data
points—as evidence of [this] aspirational balance of advantage.”12
The 2018 version of this theory advances the argument in two ways. First, I will
argue that when the Court has invented doctrines that expand the common law
protection, based on its view of sound policy, these innovations are often unstable.
Second, I will argue that the Court is free to shrink the common law protection when
two conditions are present: (1) the values that underlie the common law of tort have
changed; and (2) the change meets the need for law enforcement in a modern, more
complicated, and more dangerous world. We saw an example of appropriate shrink-
age in the modern rejection of the rule that an officer arrested the wrong person at
his peril. In sum, the common law superstructure provides a sort of upside limit for
Fourth Amendment protection without also providing a floor.
I. THE TEXT
The interpretation problem at the heart of the Fourth Amendment is profound.
This is one, perhaps the greatest, reason courts and scholars are drawn to colonial
history; they are searching for guidance. The amendment is curiously worded:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
9 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
10 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299–300 (1999).
11 Dripps, supra note 1, at 1130 (noting my contribution).
12 Id. at 1129.
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shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon proba-
ble cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.13
Notice the passive voice in the first clause. Unlike the Sixth Amendment, which
says that the accused “shall enjoy” a right to an impartial jury trial, to confront wit-
nesses, and to have the assistance of counsel (among other rights),14 the Fourth Amend-
ment appears simply to recognize a pre-existing right: “The right of the people to be
secure . . . shall not be violated.”15 And though the second clause is very precise about
what constitutes a valid warrant, nowhere does the amendment tell judges when war-
rants must be used to search or seize.16 As far as the explicit text is concerned, Congress
could authorize warrantless arrests, as the Court claims Congress did in 1792 and sev-
eral times since.17 On the Court’s account of congressional intent, an arrest did not
always require a warrant.18 On this account, and as far as the Fourth Amendment
text is concerned, Congress could have authorized warrantless searches as well.19
Historians agree that the Framers had the English writs of assistance on their
mind when they wrote the Fourth Amendment.20 These hated writs permitted random,
suspicionless customs searches of homes, ships, and warehouses. Indeed, the writs
played a major role in fomenting the Revolution.21 By statute, the writs expired on
the death of the king, George II, in 1760 and had to be reauthorized.22 When the
Massachusetts Bay Colony petitioned the Superior Court in Boston to reauthorize
the writs, James Otis was the Acting Advocate General for the Bay Colony and, in
1761, was asked to argue on behalf of reissuing the writs.23 He refused, stepped
down from his office, and instead represented the merchants who opposed the writs.24
John Adams as a young man was in the room when Otis made his passionate argu-
ment against reauthorizing the writs of assistance.25 Otis would, of course lose the
13 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
15 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16 See id.
17 See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 415, 417, 418, 420–21 (1976). Thomas Davies
disagrees with the Court’s reading of the 1792 Act. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the
Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 611–12, 611–12 n.171 (1999).
18 Watson, 423 U.S. at 415–16.
19 Id.
20 See Thomas, Time Travel, supra note 2, at 1466–67, 1488.
21 See id.
22 George C. Thomas III, Stumbling Towards History: The Framers’ Search and Seizure
World, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 199, 206 (2010) [hereinafter Thomas, Stumbling Towards History].
23 M. H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 316 (1978).
24 Id.
25 DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 61–62 (2001).
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argument; the writs were authorized by Parliament, and English courts had (and
have) no authority to strike down acts of Parliament.26 But Adams would later say
that Otis’s argument was critical to the independence movement because every man
in the crowded audience went away “ready to take up Arms against Writts of
Assistants [sic] . . . . Then and there the child Independence was born.”27
Early congresses would not have wanted to take any action that reminded the
young nation of the writs of assistance. Congress has never authorized a general
warrantless search or writ of assistance.28 But there is nothing in the text of the
Fourth Amendment that forbids this congressional action, nothing in the text that
requires warrants.29 Of course, even Justice Scalia conceded that one can read some
kind of implicit warrant requirement or preference in the text.30 Why put so much
stress on the precise requirements of a valid warrant if Congress can simply ignore
the Warrant Clause by authorizing warrantless searches?
But if there is a search warrant requirement, does it apply to all searches or only
some? History teaches that the Framers could not have intended a search warrant
requirement for all searches. We know, for example, that eighteenth-century com-
mon law permitted a constable without a warrant to “break open the doors [of a
house] to keep the peace and prevent the danger” if his demand to enter was refused
and he suspected there was “likely to be manslaughter or bloodshed.”31 Though the
history is less certain here, it seems likely that the common law also permitted a
warrantless search incident to arrest.32
If our search warrant requirement or preference applies only to some searches,
we must identify that subset to which the requirement applies. Identifying that
subset has been, as Donald Dripps notes, a “long struggle.”33 Nothing in the lan-
guage of the amendment provides any guidance.
History is helpful. The text of the Fourth Amendment is not. Most of the Bill of
Rights guarantees create a template of what is being guaranteed. We know what a
right to a public trial before an impartial jury looks like.34 We know what it means
to be informed of the nature of the accusation against the defendant.35 We might not
26 Jackson v. Attorney General, [2005] UKHL 56, para. 9, [2006] 1 AC 262 (appeal taken
from Eng.).
27 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 107 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965).
28 Thomas Y. Davies, Can You Handle the Truth? The Framers Preserved Common-Law
Criminal Arrest and Search Rules in “Due Process of Law”—“Fourth Amendment Reasonable-
ness” Is Only a Modern, Destructive, Judicial Myth, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 51, 104 (2010).
29 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
30 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
31 2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 95 (1736).
32 See infra Section IV.C.
33 Donald A. Dripps, The Fourth Amendment and the Fallacy of Composition: Determinacy
Versus Legitimacy in a Regime of Bright-Line Rules, 74 MISS. L.J. 341, 355 (2004).
34 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
35 Id.
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know the precise parameters of the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment,36 but we could confidently identify the core right—no public flogging,
no cutting off of ears or hands, no drawing and quartering convicted prisoners. While
difficult questions about providing counsel to indigent defendants lurk beneath the
surface of the right to counsel, we know that, at a minimum, the Sixth Amendment
guarantees defendants the right to counsel of their choice if they are paying for it.37
What does the Fourth Amendment template look like? When police obtain a
warrant, we know what the warrant must be based on and what it must contain.38 But
as to when warrants are required and how police must conduct warrantless searches,
all we know is that police must act reasonably.39 And that means . . . what? It surely
means police cannot act like the British customs officers in colonial America and
search houses without specific cause. But that is a pretty narrow template. And the
text does not really even tell us that. We again draw that template from history.40 What
about stopping and searching vehicles? What about stopping vehicles at a drunk
driving checkpoint? What about searching a person who has been stopped on the
street but not yet arrested? What does the text tell us about these police encounters?
The answer: nothing. We do not have a text that provides guidance, and the Court
has had to construct a doctrine from other sources. As we will see, the early cases
drew heavily on the common law and political theories that underlay the common
law; later cases sought to freelance in ways that expand Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. The freelancing has been far less successful because it is not supported by a
common law superstructure.
II. THE COMMON LAW TORT OF TRESPASS
As I have demonstrated in more detail elsewhere,41 the common law protection
of property, privacy, and freedom from unlawful restraint in colonial America came
from tort law, and only tort law. More importantly, this continued to be true for over
a century after the Fourth Amendment was ratified.42 Those charged with a crime
based on what the government took in violation of tort law could offer no defense
in a criminal prosecution.43 The only remedy the criminal defendant could seek was
a tort judgment.44 The common law tort protection of privacy/property/restraint came
36 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
37 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
38 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
39 Id.
40 See Thomas, Time Travel, supra note 2, at 1767–68.
41 See generally Thomas, Stumbling Towards History, supra note 22 (describing the tort
of trespass that existed in colonial America).
42 Id. at 209.
43 Id.
44 Id.
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of course from England.45 This was the remedy John Wilkes sought when British
Secretary of State Halifax authorized a general warrant to search for copies of a
seditious newspaper edition, North Briton No. 45.46
Halifax’s warrant authorized the king’s messengers to search for the “Authors,
Printers & Publishers” of North Briton No. 45 and to “apprehend & seize [them], to-
gether with their papers.”47 The warrant named no place to search or person to seize.48
The messengers arrested forty-nine persons while searching for the author and
publisher of North Briton No. 45, including, finally, John Wilkes.49 The search for
and seizure of his papers occurred on April 30, 1763.50
That North Briton No. 45 was seditious libel by the standards of 1763 is not open
to serious doubt. The subtitle quoted Virgil—“our striking a laughing stock”—sug-
gesting that the king’s court had rendered England a “laughing stock” among civilized
nations.51 The text leveled charges against King George III’s ministers;52 John Wilkes
was quite the rebel, but he wasn’t suicidal enough to accuse George III directly. The
king’s ministers were an inviting target. Wilkes wrote that they were causing the king
“to give the sanction of his sacred name to the most odious measures, and to the
most unjustifiable public declarations;”53 the ministers were using “foul dregs” of
power and the “tools of corruption and despotism;”54 they were “weak, disjointed,”55
and deserving to be held in “contempt and abhorrence” by foreign leaders.56 Seeking
to curry favor, perhaps, with the king’s House of Hanover, Wilkes wrote, “The Stuart
line has ever been intoxicated with the slavish doctrines of absolute, independent,
unlimited power of the crown.”57 King George III, of the House of Hanover, was an
improvement over the Stuart monarchs: “The personal character of our present amiable
sovereign makes us easy and happy, that so great a power is lodged in such hands,” but
his ministers have “given too just cause for him to escape the general odium.”58
In the wake of the king’s widespread search for the printer of North Briton No.
45, Wilkes and other plaintiffs sued the messengers who executed the general
45 Id.
46 Id. at 213.
47 ARTHUR H. CASH, JOHN WILKES: THE SCANDALOUS FATHER OF CIVIL LIBERTY 101
(2006).
48 Id. at 2.
49 Id. at 105.
50 Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 491 (1763) (Common Pleas).
51 2 THE NORTH BRITON No. 45 (title page) (1763). Not every issue had a subtitle and the
one for No. 45 appears to have been chosen especially for that issue.
52 Id. at 296–97.
53 Id. at 296.
54 Id. at 298.
55 Id. at 300.
56 Id. at 297.
57 Id. at 300 (emphasis added).
58 Id.
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warrant, as well as Secretary Halifax who issued the warrant, and obtained judg-
ments in tort of amounts that the crown considered outrageous.59 The eighteenth-
century historian, Thomas Erskine May, concluded that the total amount that the
crown spent defending the suits and paying damages was one hundred thousand
pounds in money of the time, or tens of millions of pounds in today’s money.60
Plaintiff Wilkes’s tort trial against Secretary Halifax and the messengers who
executed the warrant began at 9:00 A.M. on December 6, 1763, and the jury returned
its verdict at 11:20 P.M.61 What almost no one remembers is that about six weeks
later, Wilkes was prosecuted in absentia for treasonous libel for printing North
Briton No. 45.62 He was convicted in 1764 and sentenced to ten months in prison.63
He returned to England from France in 1768 and served his sentence; it rendered
him a broken man.64
The record of Wilkes’s criminal case is clear that the contents of North Briton
No. 45 were included in his trial for treasonous libel.65 There was no rule of exclu-
sion of evidence seized in violation of tort law.66 It was tort law, and fear of civil tort
judgments, that protected property, privacy, and freedom from unlawful restraint in
eighteenth-century England and in the colonies. Thus, when I speak in this Article
of the common law protection of property, privacy, and freedom from unlawful re-
straint, I refer to the law of the tort of trespass.
The eighteenth-century magistrate manuals are a good source for understanding
the colonial era tort of trespass. One is New Abridgement of the Law, first published
59 For the suits against the king’s messengers, see Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 499
(1763) (Common Pleas); Money v. Leach, 97 Eng. Rep. 1075, 1077 (King’s Bench) (1765);
Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 768 (1763) (Common Pleas). The tort suit against Lord
Halifax is not fully reported anywhere but a partial sketch appears in Addenda to the Nineteenth
Volume, Howell’s State Trials, 1381, 1406–1415 (1763–1770). The suit against Halifax was
heard in November, 1769, or some six years after Wilkes sued Halifax’s subordinate, Wood,
who was in charge of the party that entered Wilkes’s shop and seized his papers.
60 2 THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND SINCE THE
ACCESSION OF GEORGE THE THIRD 1760–1860 249 (1865). The comparison of currencies
over time varies tremendously depending on the method used, but tens of millions is a middle
of the road, conservative estimate. See “Measuring Worth,” https://www.measuringworth
.com/ukcompare/ [https://perma.cc/4W5M-FA8G].
61 Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 499 (1763) (Common Pleas).
62 CASH, supra note 47, at 100–01.
63 The Case of John Wilkes, esq. on a Habeas Corpus, 19 Howell’s State Trials 982, 1132
(1768). He was sentenced to an additional twelve months for publishing an obscene poem,
An Essay on Woman, and fined 500 pounds on each conviction.
64 See CASH, supra note 47, at 328.
65 See CASH, supra note 47, at 133.
66 Whether the original seized copies were introduced in evidence, or republished copies,
is a bit unclear. See id. at 134. Under long-standing principles of exclusion in the United States,
however, evidence learned from an illegal seizure is also inadmissible. See Silverthorne
Lumber Company v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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in 1736. The 1766 version was the last published before the Bill of Rights was
written. Though published in London, Bacon was widely read in the colonies and
was influential with colonial lawyers and judges.67 Bacon explains that the word
“Trespass . . . signifies a going beyond what is lawful. It follows that every injurious
Act is, in the large Sense of this Word, a Trespass.”68 Bacon goes on to say that
“many injurious acts” have acquired specific names like treason, murder, and rape;
thus the generic tort of trespass is limited to “such injurious Acts as have not
acquired a particular Name.”69 Relevant to my article, the tort of trespass entailed
a search, a restraint of liberty, or a taking of property, without justification.70
III. IN THE BEGINNING: BOYD V. UNITED STATES
The Supreme Court essentially ignored the Fourth Amendment for the first
century of its existence.71 This is not surprising because it applied only to federal
actors.72 Federal criminal jurisdiction was tiny, and there were few opportunities for
federal agents to commit torts while trying to solve crimes.73 By far, the most com-
mon federal investigative activity involved customs law.74 Those inspections were
tightly regulated by comprehensively drafted statutes, which typically required
probable cause and made clear that inspectors were liable in tort if they did not have
probable cause.75
67 Julius Goebel, Jr., Learning and Style in the Law—An Historian’s Lament, 61 COLUM.
L. REV. 1393, 1397–98 (1961).
68 5 BACON, supra note 3, at 150.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 162–73 (false imprisonment and taking of property).
71 Two exceptions were the cases against two of Aaron Burr’s alleged co-conspirators,
which required the Court to decide whether probable cause existed to bring charges against
them, and dicta in an 1877 case to the effect that the Fourth Amendment required a search
warrant to open mail. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877) (mail); Ex parte Bollman,
8 U.S. 75 (1807).
72 See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
73 Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Framers’ Search Power: The Misunderstood Statutory History
of Suspicion & Probable Cause, 50 B.C.L. REV. 363, 421 n.273 (2009).
74 Id. at 409–10.
75 For an excellent treatment of the early customs statutes, see id. The early statutes
include Act of May 22, 1824, ch. 136, § 5, 4 Stat. 25, 30; Act of Mar. 3, 1823, ch. 58, § 5,
3 Stat. 781, 782; Act of Mar. 1, 1823, ch. 21, § 35, 3 Stat. 729, 739; Act of Mar. 2, 1821, ch.
14, § 3, 3 Stat. 616, 617; Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 122, § 4, 3 Stat. 602, 604; Act of Mar. 3,
1819, ch. 82, § 4, 3 Stat. 515, 515; Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 129, § 5, 3 Stat. 469, 470; Act
of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 103, § 4, 3 Stat. 460, 461; Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 98, § 4, 3 Stat. 458,
459; Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 79, § 25, 3 Stat. 433, 438; Act of Apr. 18, 1818, ch. 70, § 4,
3 Stat. 432, 433; Act of Mar. 1, 1817, ch. 31, § 2, 3 Stat. 351, 351; Act of Apr. 27, 1816, ch.
107, § 7, 3 Stat. 310, 314; Act of July 29, 1813, ch. 35, § 6, 3 Stat. 49, 51–52; Act of Apr. 4,
1812, ch. 49, § 4, 3 Stat. 700, 701; Act of June 28, 1809, ch. 9, § 4, 2 Stat. 550, 551; Act of
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Decided in 1886, Boyd v. United States76 was the first major Supreme Court case
interpreting the Fourth Amendment.77 Although there was no direct common law
analogy, the Court relied heavily on common law values.78 The defendants in Boyd
were charged with importing plates of glass without paying the requisite duties.79
The issue was the constitutionality of a statute requiring the production of “any
business book, invoice, or paper belonging to, or under the control of, the defendant”
that “will tend to prove any allegation made by the United States” in a proceeding
under the revenue laws.80 No such statute existed in colonial days, or in eighteenth-
century England, and the Court could not draw on any common law parallels.81
Nothing in the text of the Amendment told the Court whether this required produc-
tion of papers was an unreasonable search or seizure.82
Lacking a common law map, the Court resorted to formalist reasoning, as Morgan
Cloud has demonstrated,83 relying heavily on the values that undergird Entick v.
Carrington.84 In November, 1762—six months before the search of Wilkes’s print
shop—Lord Halifax issued a warrant to search John Entick’s print shop for specific
issues of newspapers thought to be seditious.85 The papers were found and seized.86
Entick’s tort case was not brought until 1765, two years after Wilkes recovered large
damages from the search of his print shop.87 But it was Lord Camden’s88 opinion in
Entick that gained notoriety as establishing limits on government authority both in
England and in the colonies.89
Mar. 1, 1809, ch. 24, § 18, 2 Stat. 528, 532–33; Act of Apr. 25, 1808, ch. 66, § 14, 2 Stat.
499, 502; Act of Apr. 18, 1806, ch. 29, § 8, 2 Stat. 379, 380–81; Act of July 8, 1797, ch. 15,
§ 3, 1 Stat. 533, 534; Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 17, § 6, 1 Stat. 411, 411; Act of June 7, 1794,
ch. 54, § 6, 1 Stat. 390, 392; Act of May 22, 1794, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 369, 370; Act of
Feb. 18, 1793, ch. 8, § 35, 1 Stat. 305, 317; Act of Dec. 31, 1792, ch. 1, § 29, 1 Stat. 287,
298–99; Act of Dec. 27, 1790, ch. 1, § 1, 1 Stat. 188, 188; Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, § 21,
1 Stat 55, 60.
76 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
77 See id.
78 Id. at 623.
79 Id. at 617–18.
80 Id. at 619–20 (quoting 18 Stat. 187, sec. 5 (1874)).
81 See id. at 622–23 (“As before stated, the act of 1863 was the first act in this country
or in England, so far as we have been able to ascertain . . . .”).
82 See id. at 622.
83 Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property,
and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 575 n. 90 (1996).
84 Id.
85 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 (1765).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Lord Camden was Charles Pratt, the Lord Chief Justice who instructed the jury in the
1763 Wilkes case. He was named Baron Camden, and elevated to the House of Lords, before
he sat on Entick’s case.
89 Id.
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The reason for its fame is easy enough to explain: Wilkes’s legal argument was
powerful and commonsensical: a general warrant that named neither Wilkes nor his
print shop could not authorize seizure of his papers.90 If that was not already the
common law of England, it certainly should have been, and Wilkes v. Wood con-
firmed that it was the law.91
Entick is based on a much more libertarian, profound, anti-government notion.92
The crown’s defense in Entick was that the king’s messengers had a specific warrant
that named Entick and authorized a search for him and his papers.93 That warrant
would pass muster under our Fourth Amendment today. But it did not pass muster
under eighteenth-century English law. Lord Camden held that a warrant could not
authorize a search for and seizure of Entick’s papers.94 Private papers were beyond
the power of government to seize. The government could search for and seize
certain categories of property—stolen goods, for example—but it simply lacked the
authority to search for and seize private papers stored on private premises, and a
warrant could not create that authority.95
Tracking Entick, the Boyd Court struck down the statute permitting subpoenas
for documents on the ground that the owner of books and papers had a property
interest in those documents that was superior to that of the government.96 The Boyd
Court in effect created a hierarchy of property protected by the Fourth Amendment
based on its function; books and papers created for the author’s purposes were at the
top.97 The Court pointed out that even the hated writs of assistance did not require
colonists to produce their books and papers, but only permitted wholesale search for
dutiable items.98
The Court also noted a difference between statutes requiring the keeping of
books and records by those who manufacture or import dutiable items and the
statute at issue in Boyd.99 The distinction between books required to be kept and
90 See Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763).
91 Id. at 499.
92 See Entick, 19 Howell’s State Trials at 1038 (“[N]o power can lawfully break into a
man’s house and study to search for evidence against him; this would be worse than the
Spanish Inquisition; for ransacking a man’s drawers and boxes to come at evidence against
him, is like racking his body to come at his secret thoughts.”).
93 See id. at 1033–34.
94 To be sure, there were technical problems that prevented the warrant from serving as
a justification, but Lord Camden was clear that even if the warrant was properly drawn and
executed, it could not justify the seizure of Entick’s papers: “Where is the written law that
gives any magistrate such a power? I can safely answer, there is none . . . .” Id. at 1066.
95 Id.
96 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
97 See id.
98 Id. at 623.
99 Id. at 624.
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books that might be relevant to a customs violation is critical to understanding the
formalist reasoning in Boyd.100 If I manufacture liquor, which requires a license, I
voluntarily accept the record-keeping that the government requires. That gives the
government a property interest in my records that is superior to my interest, at least
if the government utilizes a subpoena or search warrant to obtain the records. But
if the government seeks letters or diary entries that I created for my own purposes,
my property interest is superior to that of the government even if the documents are
relevant to whether I paid excise tax on imported plates of glass.
Although Boyd had no common law doctrine on which to draw, it had some-
thing more fundamental: the formalist notion that the right to own property is a
natural right that predated governments.101 Thus, with a few exceptions, the ownership
of property carried with it the right to exclude government.102 And the ownership of
books and papers created for the author’s own purposes were absolutely protected.103
Neither a subpoena nor a search warrant could justify their seizure.104 The govern-
ment simply could not obtain private papers unless the owner voluntarily turned
them over. This idea seems quaint today, but it was part of the evolving notion in
English philosophy beginning in the seventeenth century that the crown’s “subjects”
existed independently of, and sometimes in opposition to, the crown.105
Boyd is based on the fundamental natural right to refuse government access to
personal papers.106 To be sure, the narrow holding in Boyd is based on “marrying”
the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination with the Fourth
Amendment.107 This “shotgun marriage” was necessary because there was no search
in Boyd:
Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are cir-
cumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory
extortion of a man’s own testimony or of his private papers to be
used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods,
is within the condemnation of that judgment.108
100 See generally id. at 623–26 (referencing English jurisprudence limiting the search and
seizure of private papers).
101 See id. at 627 (discussing Lord Camden’s reasoning in Entick v. Carrington that the
right to secure one’s own property is “sacred”).
102 See id. at 623.
103 Id. at 631–32.
104 Id.
105 See, e.g., John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of
Civil Government (1690), para. 90 (“[A]bsolute monarchy . . . is indeed inconsistent with
civil society, and so can be no form of civil government at all.”).
106 See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 631–32.
107 Id. at 616.
108 Id. at 630.
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Then a colorful metaphor: “In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run
almost into each other.”109 Despite this unsatisfying analytical structure, Boyd was
clear that privately created papers are absolutely protected from search and seizure
by the Fourth Amendment.110
That Boyd drew on the Entick notion of property ownership as a natural right is
not surprising. The Fourth Amendment by its terms applies to “persons, houses, papers,
and effects.”111 By its terms, it protects our persons and our property.112 But a prop-
erty understanding of the Fourth Amendment would not last. Justice Brandeis wrote,
in dissent, an early opinion rejecting a property-only construction in favor of a
construction that included a protection of privacy.113 In Olmstead v. United States,114
the government overheard conversations from inside private residences by tapping
phone lines outside the homes.115 There was, the Court observed, no trespass and
thus no violation of the Fourth Amendment understood in the Boyd property law
sense.116 To get around the lack of a trespass, Brandeis’s dissent argued that the
Fourth Amendment’s protection extended beyond property:
[The Framers] conferred, as against the Government, the right to
be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjus-
tifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.117
To be sure, Brandeis did not reject Boyd.118 Quite the contrary, he extolled the
virtues of Boyd’s reasoning.119 What he wanted was Boyd plus privacy, but once the
Court shifted focus from property to privacy, the hierarchical notion of papers as the
most protected form of property gradually disappears.120 As Cloud has argued,
aiding and abetting the loss of the privileged protection of papers was Gouled v.
United States,121 where the Court stated, in dicta, that there was “no special sanctity
109 Id.
110 See id. at 624–25.
111 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
112 Id.
113 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473, 475–76, 478 (1928).
114 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
115 Id. at 438.
116 Id. at 464.
117 Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
118 Id. at 474.
119 Id. at 474–75.
120 Id. at 476.
121 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
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in papers, as distinguished from other forms of property, to render them immune
from search and seizure . . . .”122 Rather than removing papers from their elevated
status, Gouled extended Boyd to all evidence that was not contraband or fruit of a
crime.123 The Gouled Court provided a list of what could be searched for with an
appropriately drafted search warrant;124 notably missing from the list is evidence that
might prove a crime.125 This became known as the “mere evidence” rule—search
warrants could not justify a search for and seizure of “mere evidence.”126 A bloody
shirt found at the murder suspect’s home could not be seized by warrant because it
was “mere evidence.”
Gouled was a bridge too far. The Court was apparently not faced with a direct
challenge to the “mere evidence” rule until 1967, when the Warren Court, in an opin-
ion by Justice Brennan, overruled Gouled as providing too much protection from
searches.127 Three members of the Court (Warren, Fortas, and Douglas) complained
that the Court should not have engaged in a complete rejection of the “mere evidence”
rule,128 but it is gone. What the Court now gives us is a literalist reading of “persons,
houses, papers, and effects”129—treated the same in terms of degree of protec-
tion—that are protected by some nebulous notion of privacy.130 So our conversations
over a telephone in our home cannot be admitted unless the person to whom we are
talking is recording or is permitting the police to record the conversation.131 It is an
odd notion of privacy but that discussion is beyond the scope of this Article.
Nothing survives of Boyd’s narrow holding that papers created for the author’s
purpose are beyond the power of the government to seize. Rule 17 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure permits courts to issue subpoenas that “order the witness
to produce any books, papers, documents, data, or other objects the subpoena desig-
nates.”132 Rule 41 permits search warrants for “documents, books, papers, any other
tangible objects, and information.”133 The natural law property notion of Entick has
122 Id. at 309.
123 Id. at 308, 309, 310–11.
124 Id. at 308.
125 See id.
126 See id. at 309.
127 See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
128 Chief Justice Warren joined Justice Fortas’ concurring opinion , that reads more like
concurring in the result, while Justice Douglas dissented. Id. at 310, 312. Justice Black
concurred in the result, so there were really only five “clean” votes to overrule Gouled. Id.
at 310.
129 See id. at 301.
130 See id. at 301–02.
131 Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), with United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1971) (plurality). A majority of the Court embraced White in United
States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 744 (1979).
132 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(1).
133 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a)(2)(A).
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not survived. But that is, in part, because the underlying conception of rights has
changed. As Justice Scalia remarked in another context, even an originalist concedes
that when the background law changes, the particular application of the Fourth
Amendment to modern times can change.134 The First Amendment provides Ameri-
can authors and publishers rights that were non-existent in King George III’s
England.135 It is no longer necessary to privilege papers created for one’s own purpose
as a means to keep the government from shutting down criticism.136 Once seditious
libel passed from the scene, and the First Amendment received a robust interpreta-
tion, the common law of Entick was no longer necessary and yielded to a pragmatist
reading of the Fourth Amendment that permits the prosecution of large scale conspira-
cies and other vast criminal enterprises that were unknown in 1792.137 Dripps agrees
that it was “legitimate” for the Court to retreat from overruling the Entick obsession
with private papers, as well as the narrow holding of Boyd was “legitimate.”138
And the overruling of Gouled is even easier to explain. It was an expansion of
Entrick and the common law to non-papers. Search warrants for evidence of crime
at common law were valid.139 As I have noted, attempts at freelancing to expand the
common law protections are unstable. Moreover, Gouled had to yield to the need to
solve crimes.140 Imagine a Fourth Amendment world in which a search warrant
could not authorize the seizure of a bloody knife as part of a murder investigation.
IV. MODERN DOCTRINE
Boyd was the opening salvo in the Court’s (still ongoing) attempt to create
meaning from the unilluminating Fourth Amendment text. The notion that privately
owned property is immune from government search because of the transcendent role
of property in our everyday lives is no longer with us, and Boyd has largely been
abandoned.141 But much of the common law doctrine that Bacon and other commen-
tators sketched in the eighteenth century is still with us. I begin with arrests.
134 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 143 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
136 I concede that my argument is an extension of Scalia’s argument in Randolph. His
argument was that changes in a free-standing law upon which the Fourth Amendment acts
can change its application. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 144. My argument is that the conception
of papers as a privileged class of property has changed, but this goes directly to the protection
of “persons, houses, papers, and effects” and is not a free-standing law.
137 Dripps, supra note 1, at 1129.
138 Id.
139 2 HALE’S PLEAS OF THE CROWN 113 (1736). See also WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 1602–1791, 582, 598 n.20 (2009).
140 See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 301 (1921).
141 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 407–08 (1976).
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A. Arrests
While the Court has sought to expand the common law by creating a compre-
hensive search warrant requirement as a way of understanding the linkage between
the first clause of the amendment (the Reasonableness Clause) and the second clause
(the Warrant Clause), it has made no similar attempt with arrest doctrine.142 Thus,
the Court’s arrest doctrine has been stable over centuries. One of the earliest Fourth
Amendment cases involved the arrest of two of the alleged co-conspirators of Aaron
Burr, and the Court held in 1807 that probable cause to detain arrestees had to refer
to a specific offense.143 That was the common law of tort, the Court simply applied
it as part of the Fourth Amendment, and it remains the law today.144
But the need for effective law enforcement has pushed the Court to cut back on
the common law of tort where arrests are concerned. The common law required that
a felony in fact have occurred before a warrantless arrest was valid.145 That the
arresting officer had “probable suspicion” that a felony had occurred was not suf-
ficient to justify the arrest,146 and the officer was liable in tort to the arrestee.147 Today,
the existence of probable cause both that a felony has occurred and that the arrestee
committed it is sufficient to make an arrest valid.148
The common law rule might have made sense in a world of villages and farms,
where the existence of a felony in fact would have been relatively easy to know, but
it would make no sense in today’s world. Indeed, English judges modified the
common law in 1827 to remove the requirement that a felony in fact had to be
committed before an arrest was valid.149 As London became larger and more danger-
ous, English judges reacted to meet the needs of law enforcement.150 The Supreme
Court would do the same when confronted with this issue in 1925.151
142 Dripps, supra note 1, at 1093, 1093 n.31 (discussing jurisprudence finding that the
“Fourth Amendment adopted the common-law arrest rules.”). To be sure, the Court has re-
quired an arrest warrant for arrests in the home. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573
(1980), but this is the only time an arrest warrant is required.
143 See Ex parte Bollman & Ex parte Swartout, 8 U.S. 75, 136 (1807).
144 See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003).
145 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *289.
146 Id.
147 See 5 BACON, supra note 3, at 163 (1766).
148 See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925).
149 See Beckwith v. Philby, 108 Eng. Rep. 585, 586 (1827).
150 Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case
Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago
Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 372 (2002). Davies’ article is an excellent treatment
of arrest law in the framing era.
151 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 133 (1925).
2018] THE COMMON LAW ENDURES IN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 101
B. Searches of Homes
The one irreducible minimum requirement for a thorough152 search of a home
or print shop at common law was the presence of a non-general search warrant.153
In some cases, as we saw in Entick, a warrant was not enough. But it was a neces-
sary, if not sufficient, condition for a thorough search under the common law of
trespass.154 In Chimel v. California,155 the Court held that a home could not be
searched incident to arrest even though, as Justice White pointed out in his dissent,
a valid arrest inside the home created an exigent circumstance that should (in his
view) justify a search without a warrant.156 The Chimel Court did permit a limited
search of the arrestee and the area within his reach.157 The permissible scope of the
search incident to arrest, and when that scope should be determined, has caused
much grief,158 but the Court has never relaxed the requirement of a warrant for a
thorough search of a home.159 The common law provides sturdy support for this rule
and it is as fixed as any doctrine about the Fourth Amendment can be.
C. Search Incident to Arrest
The common law heritage of search incident to arrest is less clear. Conductor
Generalis, a widely followed justice of the peace manual, included in its 1764 and
1788 editions an essay by Saunders Welch, former high constable of Middlesex,
England, advising constables that:
a thorough search of a felon [who has been arrested] is of the
utmost consequence to your own safety, and . . . by this means
he will be deprived of instruments of mischief, and evidence may
probably be found on him sufficient to convict him, of which, if
152 By thorough, I mean to exclude entries into the home to remedy an exigent circum-
stance. As Nelson put it in his 1704 treatise, constables “may break open the Doors to see
the Peace kept” without a warrant. WILLIAM NELSON, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A
JUSTICE OF PEACE 148 (1704). Bacon agrees. 5 BACON, supra note 3, at 177. For the modern
version, see Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006). Moreover, some treatises
and manuals permitted forcible entries into homes to arrest felons. See, e.g., 5 BACON, supra
note 3, at 179. No treatise or manual, however, stated that a thorough search of a home could
be justified by an entry to keep the peace or make an arrest for felony.
153 5 BACON, supra note 3, at 177–79 (1766) (by implication).
154 See Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 (1765).
155 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
156 See id. at 780–81 (White, J., dissenting).
157 Id. at 766.
158 This grief is summarized in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
159 See id. at 339 (summarizing the holding in Chimel that a search incident to arrest is limited
to the arrestee’s person and area within his immediate control) (internal quotations omitted).
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he has either time or opportunity allowed him, he will be sure to
find some means to get rid of . . . .160
That is clear enough, but it was a lonely view among the framing era materials.
The preeminent Fourth Amendment historian, Thomas Davies, noted that “the
doctrine of search incident to arrest is not uniformly accorded importance in the
framing-era materials . . . .”161 I think a stronger claim can be made. William
Cuddihy, who has written a massive volume devoted to the history of the Fourth
Amendment, writes of search incident to arrest that “numerous legal manuals that
appeared just before and after [1777–87] upheld the practice in almost identical
language.”162 When I checked his citations, however, I could not find any mention
of the search-incident practice other than in the 1764 and 1788 editions of Conduc-
tor Generalis.163 Instead, Cuddihy’s sources justify a warrantless entry to arrest.
Cuddihy seems to assume that a justified entry to arrest carries with it the right to
search, but nowhere is this stated in the materials he cites. I checked other framing
era materials that Cuddihy did not cite.164 These materials too are bare of any
explicit authorization of search incident to arrest.165
It appears that Conductor Generalis is the sole explicit support for the Supreme
Court’s boast in Weeks v. United States166 that the right “to search the person of the
accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime”
was “always recognized under English and American law.”167 The Weeks claim was
clearly hyperbole, and the Court cites in support only nineteenth-century sources,168
but Conductor Generalis perhaps makes the case that the Framers were aware of the
search incident to arrest rule. As Davies points out, “[d]uring the framing era,
160 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS 117 (James Parker ed., 1788); CONDUCTOR GENERALIS 117
(James Parker ed., 1764). That the quote appears on the same page in manuals separated by
twenty-four years suggests that there were minimal changes in the later version.
161 Davies, supra note 17, at 627 n.213.
162 CUDDIHY, supra note 139, at 665.
163 I checked Cuddihy’s pincites in JAMES DAVIS, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 15–16 (1774); CONDUCTOR GENERALIS 12, 25–28 (Hugh Gaine
Printing, 1788); JOHN F. GRIMKE, THE SOUTH CAROLINA JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 20–21, 27
(1788); FRANCOISE-XAVIER MARTIN, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF THE
PEACE 46 (1791); RICHARD STARKE, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF THE
PEACE 6, 107 (1774); WILLIAM SIMPSON, THE PRACTICAL JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND
PARISH OFFICER 25–26 (1761).
164 RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER (1772 & 1793
editions) was a popular manual. I also searched WILLIAM WALLER HENING, NEW VIRGINIA
JUSTICE (1794).
165 See supra note 164.
166 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
167 Id. at 392.
168 See id. (citing 1 Bishop. Crim. Proc. § 211; Wharton, Crim. Pl. & Pr. 8th ed. § 60;
Dillon v. O’Brien, 16 Cox, C. C. 245 (1887)).
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Americans drew their understanding of common-law criminal procedure primarily
from the leading treatises . . . as well as from a variety of derivative works, including
especially justice of the peace manuals.”169 The earliest substantial justice of the
peace manual published in America was Conductor Generalis, first published in New
York in 1749. The 1749 version did not include the Welch essay, because he did not
publish his essay until 1754,170 and the first version of Conductor Generalis contains
no mention of search incident to arrest.171 But both the 1764 and 1788 manuals do
include the Welch language urging constables to search incident to arrest.172
That the Welch essay appears in 1754 and then is incorporated into perhaps the
leading American justice of the peace manual in 1764 and 1788 might suggest that
search incident to arrest was a relatively new development in the colonial law of
search and seizure. Davies believes, however, that search incident was simply part
of the landscape and was rarely mentioned because it was understood to be but a
petty additional invasion of one’s liberty after one was arrested.173 Like horse and
wagon, the arrest and search were yoked together:
Because detaining a person to conduct a search would have con-
stituted an arrest and trespass at common law, the critical legal
issue was whether there were grounds for a warrantless arrest. If
the arrest was justified, the search was not an additional trespass;
if the arrest could not be justified, neither could the search.174
Cuddihy seems to believe the same, because he cites the common law rule justifying
warrantless arrest as authorizing a search of the arrestee, though he never makes his
view explicit.175
It seems likely that there were few searches incident to arrest in the colonial era.
As Davies points out, beyond stolen goods and weapons, there was not much to be
searched for in the colonial era.176 Moreover, rather than overzealous like many of
today’s officers, colonial constables were reluctant to make arrests and searches, in
large part because they feared the personal tort liability that we saw befall the king’s
messengers in the Wilkes and Entick cases.177 Another reason not to make intrusive
169 Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now-Forgotten Common-
Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Understanding of “Due Process of Law,”
77 MISS. L.J. 1, 72–73, 72 n.220 (2007).
170 SAUNDERS WELCH, OBSERVATIONS ON THE OFFICE OF CONSTABLE (Millar, 1754).
171 See CONDUCTOR GENERALIS 117 (James Parker ed., 1749).
172 See CONDUCTOR GENERALIS 117 (James Parker ed., 1788); CONDUCTOR GENERALIS
117 (James Parker ed., 1764).
173 Davies, supra note 28, at 69.
174 Id. at 70.
175 See CUDDIHY, supra note 139, at 664–65.
176 Davies, supra note 17, at 627.
177 Id. at 624 n.203, 625, 630, 630 n.222.
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searches was the generally prevailing attitude in the colonies that government should
not interfere in private affairs unless absolutely necessary.178 Constables would have
partaken of this “Don’t Tread on Me” philosophy.
Indeed the tone of Welch’s comments on search incident suggests that consta-
bles were not searching arrestees often enough.179 Doing a search incident, he said,
was “of the utmost consequence.”180 This fits with the picture that the practice had
been available for a very long time and was just not used very often. Still, no other
justice of the peace manual or treatise states the proposition—not Blackstone, not
Coke, not Hale, not Hawkins, not Burn, not Bacon—which does seem odd if it were
such an established practice. Moreover, neither the 1792 Conductor Generalis,
published in Philadelphia, nor the 1794 Conductor Generalis, published in Albany,
included the Welch essay or mentioned the practice of search incident to arrest.181
The two lonely colonial references to search incident, that soon disappear, raise
questions about the antiquity of the practice, questions that courts and commentators
to date have ignored. But no manual or treatise in England or the colonies contra-
dicted Welch on this point, and the Welch essay might have been omitted from the
1792 and 1794 editions of Conductor Generalis to save on printing costs.182 On
balance, it seems more likely than not that the Framers would have been aware of
the right to search the arrestee. If that is correct, the Court’s view that the common
law provides vindication for searching incident to arrest seems sound enough.
Moreover, any other rule would be nonsensical. Imagine a world in which an officer
has to stand guard over an arrestee until a search warrant is obtained.
D. Consent Searches
In Entick, Lord Camden spoke of granting a license to the government as a jus-
tification for a search.183 Today the Court speaks of consent and has generally
followed the common law,184 though one can argue that it has defined consent in a more
lenient way than the common law did. Consider Lord Camden’s famous Entick dicta:
By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be
it ever so minute, is a trespass. No man can set his foot upon my
178 See Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181,
1325 (“The Framers . . . were even more hostile to government interference than their
countrymen overseas.”).
179 See Davies, supra note 17, at 627.
180 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS 117 (James Parker ed., 1788); CONDUCTOR GENERALIS 117
(James Parker ed., 1764).
181 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS (James Parker ed., 1794); CONDUCTOR GENERALIS (James
Parker ed., 1792).
182 I owe the printing cost insight to Tom Davies. Email to author, August 12, 2016.
183 Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 1066 (1765).
184 Thomas, Stumbling Toward History, supra note 22.
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ground without my license, but he is liable to an action though
the damage be nothing; which is proved by every declaration in
trespass where the defendant is called upon to answer for bruis-
ing the grass and even treading upon the soil.185
“License” means an express permission to an act that would otherwise be illegal.186
What Lord Camden thought it meant in Entick is unclear, but given the extreme
deference to property rights at that date in England, it seems likely that he would have
required more than the Supreme Court requires. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,187 the
Court held that consent to permit a search need only be voluntary, which it essen-
tially defined as non-coerced.188 So a hurried, “Mind if I check you?” followed by
the seated suspect lifting his hand eight inches from his legs is good enough for the
Supreme Court.189 Would Lord Camden have understood that as license? It seems
unlikely. But as is true with Boyd, the background assumptions in law likely changed
in the time between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries. Property does not create
quite the moat against the government as it did in the era of George III.
One thing is certain. Lord Camden would not have approved of Illinois v.
Rodriguez,190 where the Court held that someone could give valid consent even
though she did not live in the apartment she permitted the police to enter.191 The
Court’s theory was that the Fourth Amendment only requires searches to be reason-
able, and thus the Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the officer reasonably believed
the person “consenting” had the authority to consent.192 Whatever Lord Camden
might have meant about the degree of assent required to constitute a license, no one
who lacks legal authority to give a license can do so. So here we see a stark departure
from the common law, one that, in my view, is not necessitated by law enforcement
needs. Police had probable cause to enter the apartment in question and could have
gotten a warrant rather than rely on fictional consent. But Rodriguez was a 6–3
decision,193 and the Court has shown no inclination to revisit.
Rodriguez is a minor restriction of common law protection. But the Court in the
twentieth century would expand the common law in two major ways, both of which
have seen full-scale retreats. These retreats support my thesis that expanding too far
beyond the common law superstructure leaves Fourth Amendment doctrine in a
vulnerable state.
185 Entick, 19 Howell’s State Trials at 1066.
186 License, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1059 (10th ed.).
187 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
188 Id. at 248–49.
189 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 199 (2002).
190 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
191 Id. at 186.
192 Id. at 188–89.
193 Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, dissented, without quoting
Entick’s powerful language. Id. at 189.
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E. The Search Warrant “Requirement”
As noted earlier, the Fourth Amendment is silent about the relationship between
the first clause of the amendment, noting a pre-existing right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, and the second clause that creates specific requirements
for a warrant to be valid.194 Casting about for a theory of how best to read the Fourth
Amendment, the Court in 1948 began to insist that there was some sort of search
warrant “requirement.”195 Johnson v. United States196 stated the rationale for a search
warrant “requirement” in stirring and oft-quoted words of Justice Jackson (just
returned from his duties as chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg Nazi trials):
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement
the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw
from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those in-
ferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence
sufficient to support a magistrate’s disinterested determination
to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a
search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nul-
lity and leave the people’s homes secure only in the discretion of
police officers. Crime, even in the privacy of one’s own quarters,
is, of course, of grave concern to society, and the law allows
such crime to be reached on proper showing. The right of offi-
cers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not
only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in
reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the
right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is,
as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman
or Government enforcement agent.197
From the hallway of a hotel, the officers in Johnson smelled burning opium and
knocked on the door of the room from which they thought the smell was ema-
nating.198 A woman answered the door; one of the officers said he wanted to talk to
194 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
195 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–15 (1948).
196 Id.
197 Id. at 13–14 (footnotes omitted).
198 Id. at 12.
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her; and she “‘stepped back acquiescently and admitted us.’”199 When the officers
determined the woman who answered the door was the sole occupant of the room,
they arrested her and found opium in a search of the hotel room.200 The only justifi-
cation for the warrantless search of the hotel room was incident to arrest:201 though
today this might or might not qualify as a valid search incident (depending on where
the drugs were in relation to Johnson when she was arrested), the doctrine at the
time permitted the search of the entire area under the control of the arrestee.202
The government conceded that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest
Johnson until they determined that she was the sole occupant of the room.203 The of-
ficers did not know that, of course, until they had entered the room.204 The Court
held that they had secured entry “under color of office.”205 “It was granted in sub-
mission to authority rather than as an understanding and intentional waiver of a
constitutional right.”206 Having thus ruled out consent, the Court held that the arrest
was illegal because the entry was illegal; the search incident to arrest had to fall as
well.207 As there was no search incident basis to justify the search, it required a
warrant.208 Four members of the Court, including Chief Justice Vinson and Justice
Black, dissented without opinion.209
The Court did not offer much in the way of a precise statement of the search
warrant “requirement” in Johnson:
There are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the
need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy,
it may be contended that a magistrate’s warrant for search may
be dispensed with. But this is not such a case. No reason is
offered for not obtaining a search warrant except the inconve-
nience to the officers and some slight delay necessary to prepare
papers and present the evidence to a magistrate. These are never
very convincing reasons and, in these circumstances, certainly
are not enough to by-pass the constitutional requirement.210
199 Id. (quoting one of the officers who testified at trial).
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (upholding search incident to arrest of a
four-room apartment).
203 Johnson, 333 U.S. at 16.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 10.
206 Id. at 13.
207 Id. at 16–17.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 17.
210 Id. at 14–15.
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Notice that the officers did have probable cause to get a search warrant to search the
room, based on the odor emanating from the room.211 While that smell would not
justify an arrest of Johnson until police determined she was the sole occupant, it
would have sufficed to obtain a warrant to search the room.212 Notice, too, that
Justice Jackson used the phrase “constitutional requirement” to express the need for
a search warrant.213
Four months later, the Court attempted to create a more precise account of the
search warrant “requirement.”214 The rationale is, roughly, whether it was practicable
to obtain a warrant.215 A search warrant is necessary, the Court told us in Trupiano
v. United States,216 unless some factor “would make it unreasonable or impracticable
to require” the officer “to equip himself with a search warrant.”217 What makes
Trupiano an easy case for a search warrant “requirement” phrased in terms of prac-
ticality is that the government had known for months about the illegal distillery
business that was the subject of the search and the arrests.218 Requiring agents to get
a search warrant here, unlike Johnson, would not have required them to pause in
their crime investigation.219 It simply required them to walk down the hall and find
a judicial officer before they went to the distillery; the Court noted archly that
“various federal judges and commissioners [were] readily available.”220
That the search warrant “requirement” based on practicality was in trouble from
the beginning is evident by the 5–4 margin in Trupiano, the perfect case for requir-
ing a warrant where practicable.221 Chief Justice Vinson is quite right when he says
in dissent: “Nothing in the explicit language of the Fourth Amendment dictates”
suppression of the evidence on the facts of Trupiano.222 He, Justice Black, Justice
Reed, and Justice Burton were unwilling to fasten a preference for judicial determi-
nation of probable cause on the vague commands of the Fourth Amendment:
Requiring “an ex post facto judicial judgment of whether the arresting officers might
have obtained a search warrant” can only be expected “to confound confusion in a
field already replete with complexities.”223
While requiring police to obtain warrants when practical makes sense as a
policy matter, Vinson is right that it would require courts to inquire into the facts of
211 Id. at 15.
212 Id. at 13.
213 Id. at 15.
214 Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
215 Id. at 705.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 708.
218 Id. at 706.
219 Id.; see Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
220 Trupiano, 334 U.S. at 703.
221 Id. at 710.
222 Id. at 711 (Vinson, C. J., dissenting).
223 Id. at 716 (Vinson, C. J., dissenting).
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each case, and the Court soon jettisoned that statement of the search warrant “re-
quirement” for one that is presumably easier to apply.224 In Katz v. United States,225
the Court told the world in 1967 that “searches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions.”226 The Katz analysis shifts the inquiry from the facts of
a specific investigation to whether a particular category of searches should require
a warrant.227 Some obvious examples of searches that should not require warrants
include, as we have seen, searches incident to arrest and consent searches.228
Though the Court has continued to pay lip-service to this search warrant “re-
quirement,”229 the current version is but a feeble reminder of cases like Johnson and
Trupiano. The single biggest hole blown in the search warrant “requirement” was
the shot Chambers v. Maroney230 fired in 1970, only three years after Katz told us
that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable.231 In Chambers, the police seized
a car based on probable cause, believing it contained evidence of a robbery.232 Police
placed the occupants under arrest and took the car to the police station.233 Over a
single dissent, the Court held that no warrant was required to search the car after it
was safely secured at the police station.234
Chambers drew on a line of cases that permitted warrantless searches of vehicles
stopped on the road.235 The underlying notion, of course, is that a car stopped on the
open road is mobile and if the police have probable cause to believe it contains
evidence of a crime, police have three choices. They can seize the car and hold it
until they get a warrant, they can search it on the spot, or they can let it proceed
without being searched.236 Given probable cause to believe evidence of crime is at
hand, letting it proceed unmolested is an unappealing choice. As between the first
two (seize and get a warrant or search without a warrant), the Fourth Amendment
might be indifferent to which course of action is preferred.
The Fourth Amendment’s indifference between these choices is precisely the
argument Justice White makes in Chambers.237 But as Justice Harlan noted, the
224 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
225 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
226 Id. at 357.
227 Id. at 357–58.
228 See supra Section IV.B–C.
229 See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335, 337 (2009).
230 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
231 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
232 Chambers, 399 U.S. at 44.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 52, 55.
235 The first case in the line is Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
236 See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51.
237 Id. at 51–52.
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decision to seize the car in Chambers had already been made, and the car was safely
in police custody.238 Thus, Chambers is unlike the seminal vehicle case, Carroll v.
United States,239 because there the police chose to search the car on the open high-
way.240 Once the police decided in Chambers to arrest the occupants, seize the
vehicle, and take it back to the station, there was no longer any difficult choice
between searching it or letting the vehicle proceed without being searched.241
Indeed, why not recognize, as a new category, searches of vehicles safely in police
custody, a category that would require a warrant? Without explanation, Justices
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall joined Justice White’s opinion that drove a stake
through the heart of the search warrant requirement.242
Only Justice Harlan recognized the damage that Chambers did to the Johnson-
Trupiano search warrant requirement:
In sustaining the search of the automobile I believe the Court
ignores the framework of our past decisions circumscribing the
scope of permissible search without a warrant. The Court has
long read the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of “unreason-
able” searches as imposing a general principle that a search
without a warrant is not justified by the mere knowledge by the
searching officers of facts showing probable cause. The “general
requirement that a search warrant be obtained” is basic to the
Amendment’s protection of privacy, and “the burden is on those
seeking [an] exemption . . . to show the need for it.”
Fidelity to this established principle requires that, where excep-
tions are made to accommodate the exigencies of particular
situations, those exceptions be no broader than necessitated by
the circumstances presented.243
But Harlan dissented alone.244 Chambers is quite an expansion of the doctrine
that recognized a warrant exception for searches of cars stopped on the open road.245
Chambers is the final nail in the coffin of the Johnson-Trupiano warrant require-
ment. It was just as practicable for the police to get a warrant in Chambers as it was
238 Id. at 63.
239 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
240 Id. at 134.
241 See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 63.
242 Id. at 43, 54, 55.
243 Id. at 61 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
244 Id. at 62 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
245 Id.
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in Trupiano. And there is no longer any Johnson requirement of an “exceptional
circumstance” to justify dispensing with the warrant “requirement.”246
After Chambers, the Court relegated the search warrant requirement to only a
few categories: searches of homes and commercial premises,247 searches of smart
phones,248 searches inside the human body,249 and, perhaps, searches of luggage that
has been seized and taken to the police station.250 We can debate (many law review
articles have debated) whether the Court’s modern search warrant requirement
represents good policy. That policy argument will not detain us here. Instead, we
note that, once again, the common law endures. The common law of tort recognized
a search warrant as a defense to a tort suit for searching a home, at least for items
other than documents.251 Documents are no longer offered special protection because
the First Amendment now protects modern printers. The tort law of searches
explains the modern Fourth Amendment search warrant requirement when homes
and commercial premises are searched absent a warrant or consent.252 A smart phone
is a repository of many items; this makes a smart phone quite similar to a home, and
the Framers would understand why a warrant is necessary to search a smart phone
(after we explain to them what a smart phone is!). Luggage might be squeezed into
this conceptualization, too; surely the crown could not have avoided the Entick
246 See generally id. at 52 (majority opinion) (noting that probable cause to search and
mobility of a vehicle normally justify search without a warrant).
247 See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (home); Murray v. United
States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988) (warehouse); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (home).
248 See generally Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (requiring a search warrant
to search cellphone seized incident to arrest). 
249 See generally Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (requiring a search
warrant to compel submission to drawing of blood). 
250 See generally United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). Chadwick is in tension
with Chambers, of course. Why is luggage that is seized and taken to a police station
different from a car that is sitting in a police station parking lot? The Court justified the tension
by noting that luggage does not suffer from a greatly reduced expectation of privacy that
attends cars. See id. at 13–14 n.8. True enough, but there are echoes of Trupiano in Chadwick;
because the luggage was at the federal building, it would have been easy for the agents to
obtain a warrant. But Trupiano has been stamped out in all other contexts; why not here?
Moreover, the luggage had a higher expectation of privacy the moment the agents seized it,
but it is not clear that they could not have searched it on the spot. The Court subsequently held
that police may seize a paper bag from a car and search it on the spot if they have probable
cause to believe it contains contraband. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579–80 (1991).
Scalia assumed in his opinion concurring in the judgment in Acevedo that a briefcase could be
searched if found in a car but not if seized from someone walking down the street. Id. at 581
(Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia cites no authority for that statement, and it is not clear to me
that it is accurate. If police can seize a briefcase from someone walking down the street, based
on probable cause, then all Chadwick stands for is that luggage at the police station cannot
be searched without a warrant. But what is the non-Trupiano justification for that rule?
251 See supra Part II (discussing the Wilkes and Entick cases).
252 See supra notes 247–50 and accompanying text.
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outcome if the messengers had seized a closed box and opened it later to discover
that it contained private papers, which were then read.
There were no searches inside the human body in the colonial era, but a require-
ment for a warrant to search a home implies a similar requirement when searching
inside the human body. The Johnson and Trupiano dicta were attempts to extend the
search warrant requirement to searches in general, where it was practicable to obtain
a warrant.253 This was a policy-based extension of the common law. Attempts by
Courts to extend the Fourth Amendment beyond the core common law tend to
sputter and burn out. What we have today is the common law rule that searches of
homes, smart phones, and luggage in the possession of the police (plus searches
inside the human body) typically require a warrant.254 This is as far as the common
law will support the Fourth Amendment warrant “requirement,” and it is where the
Court has settled.
F. The Exclusionary Rule: Past and Present
The most dramatic innovation in modern Fourth Amendment doctrine to date
was the exclusionary rule. In its pristine form, the exclusionary rule is a doctrinal
device designed to restore the status quo ante.255 If the police had obeyed the Fourth
Amendment and not searched, the reasoning goes, the government would not have
found the evidence it now possesses. The way to remedy that violation is to deny the
government the use of the evidence it found by means of the violation.256
As is obvious from my earlier description of the role of tort law in protecting
privacy, property, and liberty, eighteenth century criminal defendants had no cards
to play in their defense based on the illegality of the search or seizure.257 As late as
1904 that remained the law. In 1904, the Court recognized in Adams v. New York258
that the common law was indifferent to the way evidence was obtained.259 The Court
unanimously concluded that “the weight of authority as well as reason limits the
inquiry to the competency of the proffered testimony, and the courts do not stop to
inquire as to the means by which the evidence was obtained. The rule is thus laid
down in Greenleaf, vol. 1, sec. 254a . . . .”260
There was a second option open to the Adams Court. The Fourth Amendment
had not yet been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Court could
253 See supra notes 214–19.
254 See supra notes 247–50. Of course, consent or exigent circumstances can also justify
these searches. See Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (exigent circumstances);
supra Section IV.D (consent).
255 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (discussing the overall de-
terrent effect of the exclusionary rule).
256 Id. at 906, 908.
257 See supra notes 251–52 and accompanying text.
258 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
259 Id. at 594–95.
260 Id. at 594.
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have rejected Adams’s challenge to his state conviction on that ground. Adams raised
the issue—he had to win on it to prevail in the Supreme Court—but the Court re-
fused to consider his argument.261 In the first sentence, the Court wrote: “We do not
feel called upon to discuss” the incorporation issue.262 Forty-five years later, the Court
would reject the argument that the Fourth Amendment was included in the Four-
teenth.263 That the Court in 1904 thought the evidence rule from Greenleaf sufficient
authority to reject Adams’s appeal, with no need to rule against him on incorpora-
tion, suggests that there was just no appetite for a Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule. The unanimous Adams Court included Holmes and the first Justice Harlan.264
Adams was written by Justice Day.265 Ten years later, in 1914, Day wrote Weeks
v. United States,266 the opinion that is given credit for creating the exclusionary
rule.267 The Court was again unanimous.268 How could the entire Court have com-
pletely changed its mind in a decade? Moreover, Weeks does not overrule Adams.269
How is all of that possible? The answer, which is usually glossed over by judges and
commentators, is that the Court very much did not change its mind, and the narrow
holding of Weeks did not create an exclusionary rule, at least not in the sense the
term is used today. But to understand how Adams and Weeks can coexist requires
us to return to the formalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
We are back in 1765 with our friend, Entick v. Carrington.270 As we saw earlier,
Boyd drew on Entick’s view that the crown could never seize privately owned papers.271
Near the beginning of the Entick quote in Boyd, we see the following:
The great end for which men entered into society was to secure
their property. That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable
in all instances where it has not been taken away or abridged by
some public law for the good of the whole. . . . By the laws of
England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so min-
ute, is a trespass.272
261 Id.
262 Id.
263 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
264 Fuller Court (1903–1906), OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/court/15155/fuller19 [https://
perma.cc/EEF9-7YHK].
265 Adams, 192 U.S. at 594.
266 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
267 See George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the
Framers’ Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 145, 166 (2001).
268 Weeks, 232 U.S. at 386.
269 Id. at 396.
270 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 1066 (1765).
271 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622–23 (1886).
272 Id. at 627.
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As this quote makes plain, the protection of privacy in eighteenth century
England was a byproduct of the protection of private property. The lawyer who
represented Weeks, Martin J. O’Donnell, must have realized this important fact
about the formalist order of the day. Adams had waited until trial to ask that the
papers seized from him be suppressed;273 in short, he asked for the modern version
of the exclusionary rule, which permits a motion to exclude evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.274 Part of the rationale for rejecting Adams’s
argument was that to “stop and inquire as to the means by which the evidence was
obtained” was an interference with the orderly trial process.275
Learning from the mistake of Adams’s lawyer, O’Donnell filed a motion prior
to trial asking that Weeks’s private papers be returned to him. The question became
not whether the papers should be excluded from trial, as in Adams, but, rather,
whether the government had to return Weeks’s property to him.276 Because the
federal officer who searched for and seized Weeks’s papers had no search warrant,
the government’s property interest in the papers was inferior to that of Weeks.277
As the Weeks Court saw the issue, it “involves the right of the court in a criminal
prosecution to retain for the purposes of evidence the letters and correspondence of
the accused, seized in his house in his absence and without his authority” in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment.278 Once the issue was phrased as who had the
superior property right to the papers, Weeks would win in 1914. It was unclear at
that point in the evolution of Fourth Amendment doctrine whether even a search
warrant would justify seizure of private papers but, lacking a search warrant, the
government had no way to win the property argument.
And once Weeks’s papers were returned to him, they could not be introduced
in evidence at his criminal trial because they were physically unavailable. Justice
Day distinguished his opinion in Adams, easy enough to do, because Adams had not
asked for his papers to be returned.279 What Weeks established was not an exclu-
sionary rule qua exclusionary rule (though there is dicta in the opinion consistent
with that idea) but, rather, the right to the return of property that the government was
holding without justification.280 Notice that the Weeks narrow holding would not permit
defendants to seek return of contraband or evidence of a crime (and most of the modern
Fourth Amendment cases thus could not benefit from the Weeks narrow holding).
But Weeks, as a property-based case, was doomed by clever prosecutors. The
real exclusionary rule came into being six years later in Silverthorne Lumber Company
273 Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 589 (1904) (argument for the plaintiff in error).
274 Id.
275 Id. at 594.
276 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 389 (1914).
277 Id.
278 Id. at 393.
279 See Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 594–95 (1904).
280 Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
2018] THE COMMON LAW ENDURES IN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 115
v. United States.281 Obviously aware of the narrow holding in Weeks, the prosecutor
admitted the “outrage [of the seizure without a warrant] which the Government now
regrets” and returned the documents seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.282
But the prosecutor had made copies that he used to craft subpoenas requiring the
defendants to produce the original documents.283 This, of course, avoids the narrow,
property-based holding in Weeks. The copies belonged to the government, not the
defendants, who now had their property back.284 But the Court, speaking through
Justice Holmes, was having none of the charade.285 To permit the Government to do
in “two steps” what it is forbidden to do in one “reduces the Fourth Amendment to
a form of words. The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence
in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the
Court but that it shall not be used at all.”286 The Court thus read Weeks more broadly
than its narrow holding. Now we have an exclusionary rule.287
The modern story is that Weeks established the exclusionary rule and Silverthorne
is the case that established the doctrine of “fruit of the poisonous tree”—that the
government cannot exploit the original Fourth Amendment violation to obtain
evidence.288 In a sense, the conventional wisdom is correct, but it misses a key part
of the story. The narrow holding of Weeks was all about property. Holmes, a prag-
matist, must have realized that the Weeks rule was useless in a world where prosecu-
tors could make copies of papers they had seized unconstitutionally and use them
to get back the originals they had returned.
Once the Court crossed the Weeks Rubicon, it had no choice but to go full bore on
a modern exclusionary rule. Notice, however, that the exclusionary rule was born of
what today we might view as a fetish about the property interest in personally created
papers. That it today suppresses evidence of contraband and violent crime is an irony
that surely would not be lost on Holmes. He joined the majority opinion in the next
suppression case, the Prohibition-era case of Carroll v. United States,289 which the
defendant lost.290 One basis to rule against Carroll would have been that the exclu-
sionary rule did not apply to contraband alcohol, but the Court did not premise its
281 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
282 Id. at 391.
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 Id. at 391–92.
286 Id. at 392.
287 Silverthorne, unlike Weeks, was not unanimous. Chief Justice White and Justice Pitney
dissented without opinion. Id. Presumably, they believed that the Weeks rule was appropri-
ately limited to cases where the defendant sued for return of his property based on a superior
interest to that of the Government’s.
288 Robert M. Pitler, The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Revisited and Shepardized, 56
CALIF. L. REV. 579, 589 (1968).
289 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
290 Id. at 162.
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holding on that ground.291 Instead, as we saw earlier, it held that the search of the car
for contraband liquor was constitutional without a warrant because cars are mobile
and the agents had probable cause.292
To be sure, as Wes Oliver has demonstrated, resistance to Prohibition furthered
the development of the exclusionary rule.293 As long as defendants claiming the
protection of the Fourth Amendment via suppression of evidence were “real”
criminals, there was little incentive to provide much protection or to suppress
evidence of a search.294 But in a single stroke, the Eighteenth Amendment and the
Volstead Act that followed made potential criminals of millions of Americans who
thought drinking alcohol was a harmless diversion.295 How much Prohibition
affected the Court’s embrace of the exclusionary rule is impossible to know. It is
probably only a coincidence, but an interesting one, that Silverthorne was argued
mere weeks before Prohibition became effective.296
As long as the Weeks-Silverthorne rule applied only to federal trials, nobody on
the Court seemed to mind that it had departed from the common law as exemplified
in the 1760s cases of Wilkes and Entick and in the Greenleaf rule of evidence.
Federal criminal law jurisdiction was quite small prior to the 1960s, and the FBI and
other federal agents were generally professional in their investigations. In 1949,
Wolf v. Colorado297 held that Fourteenth Amendment due process of law did not
include the right to have evidence excluded if the state or local police violated the
Fourth Amendment.298 Thus, states could make up their own mind whether to stick
with the common law rule that tort law was the only, or at least the principal, means
of redress for government actions that infringed property and privacy rights.
Along came Mapp v. Ohio,299 decided in 1961, the first shot of the Warren Court’s
criminal procedure “revolution.” Although only twelve years had passed since Wolf,
the Mapp Court declared that “time has set its face against” Wolf’s rejection of the
exclusionary rule.300 The Court held “that the right to be secure against rude inva-
sions of privacy by state officers” was enforceable in state court the same as in federal
court.301 The Court’s prediction that its holding would not fetter state law enforcement
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 WESLEY M. OLIVER, THE PROHIBITION ERA AND POLICING: A LEGACY OF MISREGU-
LATION 6–9 (2018).
294 Id. at 27–28.
295 Id. at 39–41.
296 See 251 U.S. 385 (noting argument on December 12, 1919); Volstead Act (effective
date January 17, 1920).
297 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
298 Id. at 33.
299 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
300 Id. at 653.
301 Id. at 660.
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sounded perfectly plausible: Quoting from a case decided in the previous term, the
Court noted that federal courts “have operated under the exclusionary rule of Weeks
for almost half a century; yet it has not been suggested either that the Federal Bureau
of Investigation has thereby been rendered ineffective, or that the administration of
criminal justice in the federal courts has thereby been disrupted.”302
But the Court overlooked a critical difference between federal criminal trials in
1960 and state criminal trials, a difference that only became starker as the crime rate
soared in the late 1960s. As I have argued, letting state criminal defendants walk free
in the post-Mapp era because of a Fourth Amendment violation was a very different
challenge to justice from letting federal defendants walk free.303 Federal criminal trials
in the pre-1970s era mostly involved small amounts of drugs, gambling, and white col-
lar crime.304 Weeks was prosecuted for use of the mails in carrying out a lottery
scheme,305 and the Silverthorne defendants had been indicted for some sort of business-
related crime.306
A major pre-Mapp case limiting the power of federal officers to make arrests in-
volved the crime of possessing counterfeit gasoline ration coupons; that defendant
walked free.307 Who cared? Other pre-Mapp exclusionary rule cases involved small
amounts of narcotics or gambling offenses.308 State crimes, by contrast, include mur-
der, rape, robbery, kidnapping, and burglary.309 Making it possible for even a small
number of defendants charged with serious felonies to escape justice puts a much
greater strain on the structure of Fourth Amendment doctrine than letting petty fed-
eral criminals escape justice.
Thus, when faced with excluding evidence of serious crimes, and letting obvi-
ously guilty criminals walk free, or reading the Fourth Amendment narrowly, courts for
decades have read the Fourth Amendment narrowly. An irony of Mapp is that it
restricted the substance of Fourth Amendment rights. For example, in Illinois v.
Gates,310 the Court radically reduced the Warren Court requirements for a search war-
rant to be valid.311 If exclusion were not the remedy, or if the crime was a low-level
302 Id. at 659–60 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218–19 (1960)).
303 Thomas, supra note 267, at 167–68.
304 Thomas, supra note 267, at 172–74.
305 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 386 (1914).
306 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 390 (1920).
307 United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 582 (1948).
308 See, e.g., Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 254 (1960) (small package of heroin);
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 258 (1960) (sale of narcotics); Henry v. United States,
361 U.S. 98, 98 (1959) (possession of stolen radios); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307,
308 (1959) (865 grams, about 30 ounces, of heroin); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S.
480, 482 (1958) (paper bag containing heroin).
309 Thomas, supra note 267, at 151.
310 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
311 Id. at 222–24.
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federal gambling violation, it might have made sense to follow the Spinelli v. United
States312 regime, set out so painstakingly by Justice Harlan in a federal case in 1969.313
There are two reasons Spinelli was overruled. First, it is unclear whether any
common law superstructure supported the search warrant rules Harlan teased from
the Court’s cases. The net effect of the Spinelli so-called “two pronged” test to be
applied to warrant affidavits was to require a searching inquiry into the credibility
of the source of the evidence and into whether it was sufficient to establish probable
cause.314 While the issue is not free from doubt, Lord Hale seems to say that a search
warrant would issue based merely on the oath of one seeking the warrant.315 Hale
writes that a search warrant should be granted only upon “oath made before the
justice of a felony committed, and that the party complaining hath probable cause
to suspect they are in such house or place, and do shew his reasons of such suspi-
cion.”316 As I read that passage, the process did not require any inquiry into whether
the complainant’s reasons were supported by evidence other than his oath.
As for colonial America, William Cuddihy concludes that search warrants typi-
cally issued upon the assertion by the complainant that he had “just” cause to suspect
evidence of crime in a particular house.317 Cuddihy said that the “general rule was that
magistrates neither examined complaints independently to determine their adequacy
for [search] warrants nor withheld warrants if the assessment was negative.”318 Fabio
Arcila has shown that whatever some of the leading treatises might have said,
magistrates on the ground did not “widely engage” in aggressive scrutiny of requests
for search warrants.319
And there is a very good reason why magistrates might have typically been
satisfied with the complainant’s oath when requesting a search warrant. If the
complainant was wrong—if, for example, no stolen goods were found where he said
they would be found—the complainant was liable in tort “for as to him the breaking
of the door is lawful, if the goods are there; unlawful if not there.”320 Thus, com-
plainants had every incentive to provide only truthful information to the magistrate;
to require him to make an independent inquiry would have been redundant.
To be sure, by 1969, complainants who provided information to the magistrate
were no longer liable in tort if the information was wrong. This evolution in law calls
312 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
313 The Court reversed Spinelli’s federal conviction on the ground that the search warrant
affidavit did not give the magistrate a basis to determine whether the agents had probable
cause to search Spinelli’s apartment. Id. at 418.
314 Id. at 413.
315 2 HALE, supra note 31, at 150.
316 Id.
317 CUDDIHY, supra note 139, at 582.
318 Id.
319 Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the Trenches: Searches and the Misunderstood Common-Law
History of Suspicion and Probable Cause, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 5 (2007).
320 2 HALE, supra note 31, at 151.
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for magistrates to make a more searching inquiry than they did in Lord Hale’s day.
But the issue became whether the Spinelli test required too much of magistrates. And
since there was no common law support for any inquiry at all, the Court was free to
retreat from Spinelli.
The second, and probably larger, threat to the continued reliance on the Spinelli
two-pronged test was the Mapp exclusionary rule. William Spinelli was a numbers
runner for the St. Louis mob;321 who cared if he walked free?322 On the other hand,
in Illinois v. Gates, Lance and Sue Gates had 350 pounds of marijuana in their home.323
A case the next year asked the Court to suppress evidence of a brutal murder be-
cause the police officer used the wrong search warrant form; the Court declined.324
In sum, the Court needed a sound common law support to withstand the strain
caused by potential exclusion in thousands of cases involving serious, often brutal,
felonies. But there is no common law support for the exclusionary rule.
What happened to the exclusionary rule over the next fifty years has been the sub-
ject of several books and many, many articles. One of my favorites is Tracey Maclin’s
book that takes the reader inside the Supreme Court, drawing on the justices’ papers
to show the inexorable retreat that began only a few years after Mapp.325 I will not
detail that agonizing death march. Once the Court in the 1970s began to discuss the
purpose of the rule as deterring police violations of the Fourth Amendment, it became
possible to identify category after category of cases in which the marginal deterrence
was not justified by the cost of exclusion. Thus, exclusion is unavailable (1) when
police in good faith rely on an unconstitutional search or arrest warrant or an arrest
warrant that has been withdrawn;326 (2) in federal habeas corpus proceedings;327 (3)
in grand jury proceedings;328 (4) in federal tax penalty proceedings;329 (5) when police
violate the requirement that they knock before entering a house to serve a warrant;330
321 See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 422 (1969).
322 In a delicious historical turn of events, by 1978 Spinelli became the gambling lieutenant
of Anthony J. Giordano, who headed organized crime in St. Louis. W. V. Spinelli; Was Gambler
in St. Louis, Obituaries, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Mar. 14, 1984, at 12. But neither the trial
court nor the Supreme Court could of course have known history would play out that way.
323 462 U.S. 213, 227 (1983).
324 Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 981–88 (1984).
325 See generally TRACEY MACLIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S
EXCLUSIONARY RULE 108–11 (2012) (arguing that Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1969),
began the undoing of Mapp a mere four years after it was decided). For a review of Maclin’s
book, see George C. Thomas III, Mapp v. Ohio: Doomed From the Beginning? 12 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 289 (2014).
326 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 136–37 (2009) (arrest warrant recalled); United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905 (1984) (search warrant).
327 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 468–69, 474 (1976).
328 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 339, 342 (1974).
329 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 456–60 (1976).
330 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006).
120 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 27:85
(6) when police search based on a case that is subsequently overruled or a statute
that is later held unconstitutional.331
Indeed, Hudson v. Michigan suggested in 2006 that the Mapp doctrine, necessary
in its time, may no longer be necessary because of increased police professionalism and
greater availability of tort remedies under current statutory schemes.332 As the Court
put it:
We cannot assume that exclusion in this context is necessary
deterrence simply because we found that it was necessary deter-
rence in different contexts and long ago. That would be forcing
the public today to pay for the sins and inadequacies of a legal
regime that existed almost half a century ago.333
After discussing the changes in federal law that makes it easier to bring a tort suit
for a Fourth Amendment violation, the Court remarked, “As far as we know, civil
liability is an effective deterrent here, as we have assumed it is in other contexts.”334
Moving back in time a century, the Hudson Court seemed to think that tort might
after all be the remedy of choice, at least for most Fourth Amendment violations.335
The Court followed up on that notion three years later in Herring v. United
States336 by suggesting that the exclusionary rule might be limited to cases of
flagrant police misconduct.337 Indeed, in Herring, the Court stated that the ex-
clusionary rule is not even a right that belongs to defendants but, rather, “applies
only where it ‘result[s] in appreciable deterrence.’”338 And “appreciable deterrence”
results only when police knowingly or recklessly violate the Fourth Amendment.339
Putting these cases together, it is not a huge stretch to imagine a Fourth Amendment
where tort law is the remedy for all but the most egregious Fourth Amendment
violations. If that were to come to pass, we would be most of the way back to the
common law!
331 Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 231–32 (2011) (case); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S.
340, 356–60 (1987) (statute).
332 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597–99.
333 Id. at 597.
334 Id. at 598.
335 Id.
336 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
337 Id. at 143.
338 Id. at 141 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984), which in turn was
quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)). Leon held that an unconstitutional
search warrant executed in good faith does not justify exclusion of evidence. Leon, 468 U.S.
at 925–26. Janis held that exclusion is not available in a proceeding to determine whether
Janis owed tax penalties. Janis, 428 U.S. at 459–60.
339 Herring, 555 U.S. at 141, 143.
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G. The Exclusionary Rule: The Future
Justice Scalia’s death makes it impossible to assess the near-term movement in the
exclusionary rule area. Both Hudson and Herring were 5–4 decisions with strident dis-
sents and with Scalia in the majority (indeed, he wrote Hudson).340 Thus, if Justice
Gorsuch is a supporter of the exclusionary rule, the day of reckoning for Mapp might
be put off for a very long time. But I doubt very much that Gorsuch is any more
favorable to the exclusionary rule than the five justices who provided the majority
in Hudson and Herring.
The Fourth Amendment, after all, provides a direct, discernible benefit only to
criminals. This, of course, is why the Court quickly shifted from the exclusionary rule
being a natural part of the Fourth Amendment to the view that it has to pay for itself by
deterring police violations. Given the considerable negative hydraulic that attends
application of the exclusionary rule to cases of serious felonies, the Fourth Amendment
needs a strong superstructure to withstand the unrelenting pressure to narrow its pro-
tection. The common law provides that structure for most of the Court’s Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine. But there was no exclusionary rule at common law and for over a
century after the Fourth Amendment was ratified.341 Perhaps the Court will return
to the common law.
That is one way to read Utah v. Strieff.342 With Scalia gone from the Court, the
conservatives still managed to muster five votes (Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer,
and Alito) for yet one more exception to the exclusionary rule.343 The state conceded
that the stop of Strieff was unconstitutional because the police lacked reasonable
suspicion under the Terry v. Ohio344 stop and frisk doctrine (though they had reason
to be somewhat suspicious).345 After Strieff had been unconstitutionally stopped, the
officer discovered that there was an outstanding arrest warrant for him.346 The Court
held that the drugs found incident to the unlawful stop were admissible on the theory
that the existence of the warrant was an intervening circumstance that somehow
obviated the need to exclude the fruits of the search incident to arrest.347
As the dissenters pointed out, the officer would not have discovered the warrant at
that time but for the illegal stop, which makes the notion of intervening circumstance
quite odd if not incoherent.348 That Justices Kennedy and Breyer joined the majority
340 Id. at 136; Hudson, 547 U.S. at 587.
341 See supra notes 255–87 and accompanying text.
342 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
343 Id. at 2059–60.
344 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
345 Id. (anonymous tip that house was being used for “narcotics activity” led to visual
observation; frequent visitors came and stayed only a few minutes).
346 Id. at 2060.
347 Id. at 2064.
348 Id. at 2066–67 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (joined by Ginsburg, J.). Justice Kagan dis-
sented separately. Id. at 2071.
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opinion perhaps suggests that there were five votes to restrict the exclusionary rule
even further with Gorsuch as a potential sixth vote. The Court noted that while the
officer did conduct an illegal stop, it was “at most negligent.”349 It was not, therefore,
flagrant. Perhaps the real holding in Strieff is that the exclusionary rule is simply not
going to apply unless the government conduct is flagrant.
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent pointed out that Strieff permits stops and searches
of anyone named on an outstanding warrant.350 This is quite a limitation on the
exclusionary rule. There were, she noted, over 180,000 misdemeanor arrest warrants
in the Utah database at the time of the stop and search in 2006.351 Utah’s population
in 2006 was 2.5 million, roughly 1.5 million of whom were over 19 years of age.352
Thus, the chance of anyone 20 or older being named on an arrest warrant was about
12%. Would police engage in “fishing” expeditions on the off chance that the person
seized was named on a warrant? It seems unlikely because it is inefficient but, at a
minimum, Strieff will function as a backstop to police who believe, wrongly, that
they have reasonable suspicion to stop a suspect.
Now that Justice Kennedy’s seat is vacant, there is even more uncertainty about the
future of the exclusionary rule. One thing is clear: The exclusionary rule of 2018 is far
closer to the common law position than it was when Mapp was decided in 1961.
Stay tuned.
CONCLUSION
If one lays the framework of the common law tort of wrongful search and seizure,
and makes reasonable adjustments for changes in the way we live our lives (smart-
phones as an analog to a home, for example), one finds that the framework maps most
of the Court’s current doctrine. The one major area where it does not map is the exclu-
sionary rule. Of course, as long as a majority of justices favor the exclusionary rule, it
does not need support from a common law framework. For example, in a major
expansion of the common law that we saw earlier, the Warren Court created a robust
search warrant requirement in Spinelli v. United States,353 one without any real support
in the common law, because Justice Harlan provided the critical fifth vote (joined by
Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas, Brennan, and White). But once that coali-
tion unraveled, Spinelli could not survive.354 When justices who favor more expan-
sive police power are in the majority, Fourth Amendment doctrine needs a common
law superstructure or backstop. Without that backstop for the exclusionary rule, and
with President Trump in office, further limitations on the exclusionary rule seem likely.
349 Id. at 2063.
350 Id. at 2068–69 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
351 Id. at 2066.
352 OFFICE OF PUBLIC HEALTH ASSESSMENT, CENTER FOR HEALTH DATA AND INFOR-
MATICS, UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (last visited Oct. 15, 2018), http://ibis.health.utah
.gov/query/builder/pop/PopMain/Count [https://perma.cc/Y4SL-QLWR].
353 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969).
354 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
